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individuals and there are five survivors, either one must
be sacrificed or else all must die. Regan assumes that
our prereflective intuition is that the dog must die. 1 Aud
he supports this intuition by appealing to the worse-off
principle, which states the following:
Special considerations aside, when we must
decide to override the rights of the many or
the rights of the few who are innocent, and
when the harm faced by the few would make
them worse-off than any of the many would
be if other options were chosen, then we ought
to override the rights of the many. 2

The Case for Animal Rights by Tom Regan provides
a very cogent argument for attributing rights to animals.
Most of the students in my Ethics and Animals course,
for whom it is a required text, fmd it quite convincing.
Those students who are predisposed to acknowledge
tbat animals have rights feel assured and vindicated by
reading Regan's arguments. However, their happy
response is abruptly altered when, in the final weeks of
the course, they read the passage describing four normal
adults and a dog in a lifeboat. Regan argues that
supposing one must be sacrificed or all will die, it should
be the dog. He adds that this choice should be made
even if the decision were between four humans and a
million dogs, though all have equal inherent value. This
passage, extremely disconcerting to some of my
students, evokes much discussion both in and out of
the classroom. In this paper I will explore whether or
not my students' agitation can be philosophically
supported. I will ftrst discuss the argument as advanced
by Regan, then turu to the principles on which it is based,
and finally critically examine both the argument and
its principles.
The lifeboat situation is such that we have only two
choices: since the boat only has enough room for four
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In other words, in cases where we must choose
between harming one innocent or harming another,
and the harms are not prima facie comparable, we
should override the right of that individual who will
be harmed less. In situations calling for a decision in
which there is a disjunctive dilemma, the individual
who will be harmed less should suffer rather than the
individual who will be harmed more. Illustrating this
principle, Regan considers two people, one facing
death and the other a migraine. 3 The individual who
faces death would be harmed much more than the
individual who may suffer a migraine. These harms
are not prima facie comparable. According to the
worse-off principle, we must choose to override the
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inherent value should be treated with equal respect. But
when these individuals are to be harme<i in different
degrees, and only one can be rescued from harm, then
out of respect for both we should rescue that individual
who will be harmed more. The worse-off principle is
strong and well-supported as a formal principle.
However, in practical applications the worse-off
principle may be too vague to indicate the correct moral
decision. The vagueness of the worse-off principle is
attributable to the notion of comparable harm contained
in it. The problem with the notion of comparable harm
is that it must be assessed in specific, individual
circumstances, and this is not always an easy matter. In
some cases the assessment of comparable harm is quite
clear, as in the example of the person about to suffer a
migraine and the person about to die. There is no doubt
which harm is worse, restricting our evaluation to the
individuals involved, even if the person facing an
untimely death is a homeless hermit and the person
facing a migraine is the President of the United States.
But Regan's example of the senile mother and daughter
in the prime of life does not as clearly illustrate the
notion of comparable harm. First, it is not clear whether
the mother's death is less of a harm because she is senile
or because she is much older than the daughter. Let us
suppose that Regan is claiming that the mother's death
is less of a harm than her daughter's death both because
she is senile and much older. Is this claim as lucid and
forceful as the claim that one who suffers a migraine is
harmed less than one who suffers death?
An assumption underlying this claim is that a senile
person has less opportunities she can satisfy than a person
in full control of her mental faculties. The same
assumption plays a role in deciding that death is a greater
harm for a younger individual than for an older one. But
should this assumption be taken for granted in both cases?
For Regan, death is a harm because it forecloses
opportunities for satisfaction. 9 But the phrase
"opportunities for satisfaction" is ambiguous. It can
either mean potentials for satisfaction in the sense of
logical possibilities or it can refer to chances for
satisfaction based on a favorable combination of current
circumstances. But Regan recognizes the "well-known
problems involved in inferring what is actual from what
is potential." 10 He illustrates these problems in the
following example:

right of the person about to suffer a migraine rather
than to override the right of the person facing death. To
make the opposite choice or to flip a coin in this matter
would be to treat the person about to suffer a migraine
with more respect than he is due. 4
Regan applies the worse-off principle to the life
boat case by claiming that each human being would be
made worse off by dying than the dog would be if he
were thrown overboard. Although all five individuals
would be harmed by dying, the death of the dog is a
lesser harm, Regan argues, because death is a harm
inasmuch as it forecloses opportunities for satisfaction,
and the humans would lose more of these opportunities
than the dog would lose. Regan says, "Death for the
dog ... though a harm, is not comparable to the harm
that death would be for any of the humans." 5 In short,
since the dog's death is a lesser harm than the death of
any normal adult, the dog should be killed. To save the
dog or to flip a coin would be to count the lesser harm
done to the dog as equal to or greater than the harm
done to the humans.
One notion crucial to the life-boat situation and the
worse-off principle is that of comparable harm. It
underlies the worse-off principle, since the principle
only applies when harms are not comparable. Prior to
the life-boat passage, Regan discusses what he means
by "comparable" harm, claiming that "Two harms are
comparable when they detract equally from an
individual's welfare, or from the welfare of two or more
individuals."6 For instance, death is a comparable harm
for two individuals if they would each lose ail equal
amount of opportunities for doing what will bring them
satisfaction. But death is not a comparable harm when
one individual suffers a greater magnitude of loss than
the other. Regan says, "The untimely death of a woman
in the prime of her life is a prima facie greater harm
than the death of her senile mother." 7 Consequently,
the death of the mother is not comparable to the harm
that death would be for the daughter. In a situation where
only one could be selected to live, the worse-off
principle would require us to override the right of the
mother to live.
Having given an overview of Regan's life-boat
argument and the principles on which it is based, his
reasoning can now be evaluated. The worse-off
principle, as Regan notes, is derivable from the respect
principle. 8 According to the respect principle, we must
treat an individual with the respect she is due as a matter
of strict justice. Two individuals who have equal
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When Henry Aaron was a wee toddler it was
true that he was potentially the person who
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would set a record for the most career home
runs hit in major league baseball, and, as things
turned out, he actually set this record. But it does
not follow that the wee-toddler, who is Henry
Aaron at that time actually holds this record. 11

a sense of the future, including their own
future, who have an emotional life, who have
a psychophysical identity over time, who have
a kind of autonomy, and who have an
experiential welfare. 12

Since Regan does not think we should infer what is
actual from what is potential, it is highly probable that
when he discusses "opportunities for satisfaction," be
is not referring to potential opportunities for satisfaction
in the sense of logical possibilities. The phrase most
likely refers to chances for satisfaction based on a
favorable combination of current circumstances.
Given this more precise meaning, is it necessarily
true that an older person possesses fewer opportunities
for satisfaction than a younger person? It is not very
difficult to imagine that a mother may be an
intellectually gifted researcher, a talented artist, and an
active social reformer who takes great joy in all her
achievements, while her daughter is intellectually bereft,
has no talents, and is only interested in partying. Which
person has greater opportunities for satisfaction? If we
are only considering chances for satisfaction based on
a favorable combination of characteristics and current
circumstances, the answer is clear. There is no basis,
other than an extremely speculative one, for holding
that the daughter's opportunities for satisfaction are
greater than the mother's opportunities for satisfaction.
Focusing on the mother's senility as grounds for
saying that she has less opportunities than the daughter,
it is important to consider the degree of her impairment.
A severely impaired senile person, one who cannot
remember anything from one minute to the next, may
indeed have less opportunities for satisfaction than a
person with unimpaired faculties. But this may not be
true of a person who is moderately senile. In order to
better illustrate the problem with the notion of
comparable harm, let us suppose that the mother is only
moderately senile.
Attributing this lesser degree of senility to the
mother gives her a moral status comparable to the dog,
i.e., both the dog and the senile mother are moral
patients. Regan distinguishes two types of moral
patients: (a) those individuals who are conscious and
sentient and (b) those individuals who are not merely
conscious and sentient but

Since the dog is a moral patient in the second sense, let
us suppose that the senile mother is also amoral patient
in this sense. Does her mental impairment foreclose
certain opportunities to her? Certainly! She might not
be able to take a college course, read the newspaper, or
carry on a sustained conversation. But is it possible that
her daughter, a normal adult human being, has either
an equal amount of opportunities for satisfaction or even
fewer? Again, the sort ofopportunities under discussion
are not opportunities in the sense oflogical possibilities
in the future but chances for satisfaction based on a
favorable combination of characteristics and current
circumstances. Would the daughter, an assembly-line
worker who lives alone and who wat:<;hes television after
work until she goes to bed, only varying her routine on
week-ends and holidays by not working, have more
opportunities for satisfaction than her mildly senile (she
can remember to a limited extent) mother who socializes
with many friends, enjoys taking walks, investigating
new places, and who relishes amusement parks? As in
the case of an older person vs. a younger person, if we
are only considering chances for satisfaction based on
a favorable combination of characteristics and current
circumstances, the senile mother has more opportunities
for satisfaction.
Returning to the five survivors in the lifeboat, we
can ask the same question. Suppose the four normal
adult human beings work in the same assembly line as
the aforementioned daughter, have a cynical attitude
toward life, are companionless, and when not at work
can almost always be found in front of the television
set. Of course, there are individual variations, but none
affect their current circumstances in a substantial way.
Now suppose that the dog has close ties with her human
family, has puppies waiting for her at home, enjoys
riding in the car and long walks, and has an interest in
investigating new places and meeting new creatures.
Moreover, in addition to this dog's friendliness and acute
curiosity, suppose that a year ago this dog displayed
her courage and loyalty by rescuing a young friend from
a burning building. If all five individuals have equal
inherent value, and if death is a harm to each of them
because it would foreclose opportunities for satisfaction,

who have desires and beliefs, who perceive,
remember, and can act intentionally, who have
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is based on assessing the losses each individual faces
and assessing these losses equitably." 14 But nowhere in
the life-boat passage do we find any attempt to do this.
Rather, Regan assesses the losses Fido faces as a
representative of "doghood" as opposed to the losses
the other four survivors face as representatives of
humanity. To make matters worse, by insisting that the
four humans should be saved at the expense of a million
dogs, Regan even more emphatically implies that the
individual circumstances, characteristics, and hence
opportunities for each of a million dogs should not be
taken into account. This approach is quite inconsistent
with the rights view's overall concern with the
individual. If Regan is to avoid both inconsistency and
speciesism, he must either amend the life-boat decision
or take into account the individual differences among
the survivors to justify his initial decision. This criticism
is not merely a semantic matter, for it makes all the
difference whether a life and death decision is based
on an individual's rights as an individual or his rights
as a member of a species. Ifsuch a decision is based on
one's rights as a member of a species, Regan's argument
collapses. Thus it seems that my students prereflective
and considered intuitions were well-founded.

which of the five individuals would be harmed most by
dying? If the dog would be harmed more, then the
worse-off principle requires that one of the others should
be selected to die rather than the dog.
The primary problem with the notion of comparable
harm, as used by Regan, is that he correctly formulates
it to apply to individuals 13 but then applies it to groups:
old groups, young groups, senile groups, dog groups,
and normal human groups. Although individuals within
a group share certain characteristics, in some ways they
may be very different. And the differences among
individuals may be morally relevant for those who make
decisions about them in specific situations. Not all senile
individuals, for example, have the same opportunities
for satisfaction. Some may have a great many such
opportunities, whereas others may have few. And the
same is true for young individuals, dogs, and normal
adult humans. In trivial matters it may be more
convenient to lump all the individuals of a certain group
together, but in life and death situations it is a matter of
justice to consider each individual's opportunities for
satisfaction independent of the group she belongs to. It
may be the case that Fido should be thrown overboard
rather than Sally, Sam, Joe or Fred. But if all have equal
inherent value, and if we are to avoid speciesism, we
must consider Fido's opportunities for satisfaction to
be fewer than the others' opportunities based on his
current circumstances as Fido and not as a dog.
One problem with this solution is that in life and
death situations we may not have the time to weigh
each individual's opportunities for satisfaction.
Connected to this problem is the fact that all five
survivors may be strangers to each other. The dog cannot
talk about her background; another survivor may be
mute; and the other three may be liars. Another problem
is human error in assessing which current circumstances
may engender opportunities for satisfaction. But to
judge opportunities for satisfaction in life or death
situations without seriously examining each individual's
opportunities for satisfaction as individuals is to give
each survivor less respect than he is due. Giving an
individual less respect than he is due is a violation of
the respect principle. And to assess opportunities for
satisfaction by assuming that all members of a given
species have the same opportunities for satisfaction and
that the human species has more opportunities than the
canine species is to fall into speciesism.
Anticipating an objection of this sort, Regan claims
that the life-boat decision is not speciesist because "it
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